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NCAA v.

TARKANIAIm.

A

DELEGATION OF UNFETTERED

DIsCRETION

THE CONTROVERSY in NCAA v. Tarkanian arose out of va-

rious sanctions imposed by the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) upon the University of Nevada, Las Vegas
(UNLV) and its head basketball coach, Jerry Tarkanian. Jerry
Tarkanian became head basketball coach at UNLV in 1973. Prior
to his assumption of that position, UNLV's basketball team had a
14-14 record and was virtually unknown on the national level.'
Four years later, Tarkanian improved the team's record to 29-3
and the team finished third in the NCAA championship tournament.2 In 1977, UNLV rewarded Tarkanian with tenure.3
Tarkanian's employer, UNLV, is a branch of the University
of Nevada, which is organized and operated pursuant to the Constitution, statutes, and regulations of the state of Nevada. UNLV
depends upon the state of Nevada for its financial support.4 It is
also one of approximately 960 institutions comprising the National Collegiate Athletic Association. Like UNLV, most of the
NCAA's members are colleges which conduct major athletic programs.5 The fundamental policy of the NCAA is to maintain the
scholastic aspects of intercollegiate competition among the athletes of its members.' The NCAA promulgates rules which specifically prescribe the conduct of its member athletes in order to enforce this ideal. Among other issues, the regulations established by
the NCAA specifically address academic standards, admission requirements, financial aid, and athletic recruiting.
The NCAA established a Committee on Infractions to enforce its rules, which is commissioned with the authority to inves-

I. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. 454, 456 (1988).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 457. As head coach, Tarkanian received $125,000 per year, plus 10% of the
proceeds received by UNLV for participating in the NCAA championship tournament. He
also received a substantial sum from other activities, such as product endorsements, participation in basketball camps, and television and radio appearances. Id. at 456 n.l.
4. Id. at 457.
5. Id.

6. Id.
7. Id.
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tigate members, make factual determinations, and impose sanctions.8 Although the committee may not directly sanction an
employee of a member institution, it may order that institution to
show cause why the institution should not suffer further penalties
for failing to punish the violating employee. Members of the
NCAA are also required to fully cooperate with the committee
and to assist in any investigation. 9
In the early 1970s, NCAA officials began to suspect UNLV
of violating various NCAA recruitment rules.'" Approximately
three years later, the NCAA's Committee on Infractions notified
the University that it was going to commence an "official inquiry"
and requested UNLV to conduct a thorough investigation. Eight
months later, the University responded with a detailed report, denying all allegations and declaring head coach Tarkanian completely innocent of any wrongdoing." The NCAA responded by
conducting a four-day formal hearing at which it concluded that
UNLV had committed thirty-eight violations of NCAA rules, ten
of which were attributed solely to Tarkanian. 2
The committee also imposed a somewhat severe series of
sanctions. These sanctions, which were approved by the NCAA's
Council, placed UNLV on a two-year period of probation, during
which its "basketball team could not participate in post-season
games or appear on television."' 3 The committee also forced
"UNLV to show cause why additional penalties should not be imposed against UNLV if it failed to discipline Tarkanian by removing him completely from the university's intercollegiate athletic
program during the probation period."' 4
The NCAA ruling put UNLV in a most precarious position
- UNLV could decide to: (1) refuse to adhere to the NCAA's
mandate and risk further punishment by the NCAA, (2) adhere
to its ruling by temporarily banishing Tarkanian, or (3) sever all
ties with the NCAA.' 5 Although UNLV maintained that
Tarkanian was innocent of any wrongdoing, its president opted to
adhere to the NCAA's rulings by temporarily precluding

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id.
Id. at 458.
Id. at 458. The committee initiated a preliminary inquiry in 1972. Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 459.
Id.
Id.
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Tarkanian from involvement in UNLV's intercollegiate athletic
programs.16
Not surprisingly, this decision upset Tarkanian, who was being forced to surrender his prestigious position as well as a substantial portion of his income.1 Tarkanian, therefore, filed a section 1983 action, in Nevada state court,' seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief against his employer. 19 He alleged that the university had "deprived him of property and liberty without the due
process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution. '2' The trial court ruled in favor of
Tarkanian. 21 On appeal, the NCAA argued in an amicus curiae
brief that the suit should be dismissed because a controversy did
not exist. In addition, the NCAA argued that even if a controversy did exist, it should be involved in the suit as a necessary
party. Concluding that a controversy did exist and that the
NCAA was a necessary party, the Nevada Supreme Court ruled
that the lower court's decision should be reversed and remanded
to permit joinder of the NCAA. 2 Accordingly, Tarkanian
amended his complaint by adding the NCAA. After four years of
delay, the trial court again held in favor of Tarkanian, enjoining
UNLV from disciplining Tarkanian and enjoining the NCAA
from enforcing its sanctions against UNLV. 3
Predictably, the NCAA appealed this decision to the Nevada
Supreme Court where the lower court decision was upheld.24 The
Nevada Supreme Court ruled that the NCAA had engaged in
state action, which is a necessary finding for a section 1983 claim.
In arriving at this preliminary conclusion, the court held that the
right or duty to discipline public employees is vested solely within
the state and that the state may not dodge the liability attached to
such power by simply delegating that duty to a private entity.25
The court also felt that since the NCAA was composed primarily

16. Id.
17. As a tenured professor, Tarkanian would have earned $53,000 per year; as a
head basketball coach and tenured professor, he would have made at least $125,000 per
year, and enjoyed the benefits flowing from his success and notoriety. Id. at 456 n.1.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1986).
19. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 459.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. University of Nevada v. Tarkanian, 95 Nev. 389, 594 P.2d 1159 (1979).
23. Tarkanian, 109 S.Ct. at 460.
24. Tarkanian v. NCAA, 103 Nev. 331, 741 P.2d 1345 (1987).
25. Id. at 337, 741 P.2d at 1348.
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of government-funded institutions, the NCAA must be regarded
as a state actor for section 1983 purposes. 6 Based upon that conclusion, the Nevada Supreme Court turned to the merits of the
controversy and affirmed the lower court's decision.
Unwilling to surrender, the NCAA appealed to the United
States Supreme Court. This case presented the Court with an opportunity to lay to rest a brewing controversy as to the proper
characterization of the NCAA for purposes of section 1983
actions.

I.

HISTORY

Prior to 1982, most courts confronted with this issue held
that the NCAA was a state actor,. and therefore, susceptible to
suit under section 1983.28 Among the earlier cases, the best characterization of the NCAA was presented in Howard University v.
NCAA.2 9 In that case, the NCAA sought to place Howard's soccer team on a one-year probation and make it ineligible for postseason competition as a penalty for allegedly violating various
NCAA rules pertaining to player eligibility. Following Supreme
Court precedent, the Howard court determined that the critical
inquiry was whether the NCAA's conduct, although initially private in character, became "so entwined with governmental policies
or so impregnated with a governmental character as to become
subject to the constitutional limitations placed upon state action."3 0 The court further stated that "the government's involvement need not be either exclusive or direct; governmental action
may be found even though the government's participation 'was peripheral, or its action was only one of several co-operative forces
leading to the constitutional violation.' "31 Thus, an individual
need not carry a badge of state authority to be considered a state
actor.3 2
Before turning to the merits of the case, the court noted that

26. Id. at 335, 741 P.2d at 1347.
27. Id. at 333, 741 P.2d at 1346.
28. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. 454, 457 n.5.
29. 510 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
30. Id. at 217 (quoting Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966)).
31. Id. (quoting United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 755-56 (1966)).
32. This conclusion is contrary to an earlier understanding set forth in Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), where the Court stated that liability attaches only to those
"who carry a badge of authority of a State and represent it in some capacity, whether they
act in accordance with their authority or misuse it." Id. at 172.
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approximately half of the NCAA's participants were publiclyfunded institutions and that "public institutions provide[d] the
vast majority of the NCAA's capital."3 " In addition, representatives from public schools accounted for most of the members of
the NCAA's governing council. The court also stated that, in return, the NCAA provided an immeasurably valuable service to
public institutions through their supervision of intercollegiate athletics. 34 Based upon the interdependence between state institutions
and the NCAA, the court held that state action was present, and
therefore, federal jurisdiction existed. The court explained that to
hold otherwise would allow states to avoid constitutional restrictions by merely "banding together to form or to support a 'private'
organization to which they have relinquished some portion of their
governmental power." 35
Although Howard was reaffirmed in several cases involving
student-athletes, 36 the Supreme Court brought this trend to an abrupt halt in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,"7 which involved neither
the NCAA nor student athletics. In Lugar, Edmondson Oil Co.
filed suit to collect on a debt from Lugar, a lessee-operator of a
truck stop in Virginia. After filing suit, Edmondson sought and
received a prejudgment attachment of some of the petitioner's'
property, pursuant to Virginia law. 8 The attachment was later
dismissed by the trial judge, but the petitioner filed suit in federal
court against Edmondson pursuant to section 1983 alleging that
Edmondson and the state had acted jointly to deprive him of his
property without due process of law.39
In order to determine whether a private party may be converted into a state actor for the purpose of obtaining subject matter jurisdiction, the Court set forth a two-pronged test:
33. Howard Univ. v. NCAA, 510 F.2d 213, 219 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
34. Id. at 220.
35. Id. at 220 (quoting Parish v. NCAA, 506 F.2d 1028, 1033 (5th Cir. 1975)).
36. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Minn. v. NCAA, 560 F.2d 352 (8th Cir.), cert.
dismissed, 434 U.S. 978 (1977)(the university was permitted to avail itself of the federal
courts to contest an NCAA ruling placing the university's athletic teams on indefinite probation for refusing to find three students ineligible to compete in intercollegiate athletics);
Parish v. NCAA, 506 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1975)(five collegiate basketball players were
permitted to seek injunctive relief to prevent the NCAA from enforcing a ruling which
prohibited them from competing in various NCAA tournaments).
37. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
38. The "attachment procedure required only that Edmondson allege in an ex parte
petition, a belief that petitioner was disposing of or might dispose of his property in order
to defeat his creditors." Id. at 924.
39. Id. at 925.
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[T]he first question is whether the claimed deprivation has resulted from the exercise of a right or privilege having its source
in state authority. The second question is whether, under the
facts of this case, respondents, who are private parties, may be
appropriately characterized as "state actors."
"Private persons, jointly engaged with state officials in the prohibited action, are acting 'under color' of law for purposes of the
statute. To act 'under color' of law does not require that the
accused be an officer of the state. It is enough that he is a willful
participant in joint activity with the state or its agents." 40
Applying these principles, the Court concluded that the petitioner
was deprived of his property through state action and that the defendants were, therefore, acting under color of state law when
they participated in the petitioner's deprivation.4
Since the decision in Lugar, nearly all lower court decisions
confronting fourteenth amendment and section 1983 claims
against the NCAA have held that the NCAA is not a state actor.4 2 For instance, in Graham v. NCAA,4 3 the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that in order to establish that the NCAA is
a state actor, it must be proven either that: "(1) the NCAA was
serving a function which was traditionally and exclusively the
state's prerogative, or (2) the state or its agencies caused, controlled or directed the NCAA's action."" Basing its decision on
this conservative standard, the court held that the plaintiff was
unable to establish that the NCAA was a state actor under either
prong of the test, and that the plaintiff's complaint was properly
45
dismissed.
In the Tarkanian controversy, however, the Nevada Supreme
Court applied the rule enunciated in Lugar to reach the opposite
conclusion. Applying the Lugar two-pronged test, the court stated:
The first prong [of Lugar] is met because no third party

40. Id. at 939, 941 (quoting United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 (1966)).
41. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 942.
42. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 457 n.5.
43. 804 F.2d 953 (6th Cir. 1986)(two Graham College football players brought suit
alleging that the implementation of various university and NCAA rules had prevented
them from playing football, in violation of their constitutional rights).
44. Id. at 958.
45. Id. The Graham test was also applied by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Karmanos v. Baker, 816 F.2d 258 (6th Cir. 1987), where the court held that a student who
claimed he was denied his constitutional rights by an NCAA ruling declaring him ineligible to play intercollegiate hockey failed to state a claim against the NCAA.
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could impose disciplinary sanctions upon a state university employee unless the third party received the right or privilege from
the university. Thus, the deprivation which Tarkanian alleges is
caused by the exercise of a right or privilege created by the
state. Also, in the instant case, both UNLV and the NCAA
must be considered state actors. By delegating authority to the
NCAA over athletic personnel decisions and by imposing the
NCAA sanctions against Tarkanian, UNLV acted jointly with
the NCAA."6
Although the plausibility of the Nevada Supreme Court's approach may seem appealing, the United States Supreme Court
was not persuaded.
II. National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Tarkanian
A.

Opinion of the Court

In NCAA v. Tarkanian, the Supreme Court was finally given
an opportunity to determine the NCAA's status for purposes of
section 1983 actions. At first glance, this issue appears simple and
well-defined. The Court, however, devoted a substantial portion of
its opinion to refining the issue. Eventually, the Court concluded
that "the question is not whether UNLV participated to a critical
extent in the NCAA's activities, but whether UNLV's actions in
compliance with the NCAA rules and recommendations turned
the NCAA's conduct into state action. 4 7
The Court began by reiterating a well-known basic principle
the fourteenth amendment's due process clause does not apply
48
to private conduct, "no matter how unfair that conduct may be."
Similarly, the Court reminded its readers that section 1983 was
intended to provide a remedy for only those constitutional violations which occur "under color of" state law.4 9
Turning to the parties, the Court acknowledged that this was
not a typical section 1983 state action case. Tarkanian's primary
injury, his suspension, was directly imposed by the UNLV, an undisputed state actor. Thus, through their suspension of a tenured
employee, UNLV was clearly bound by the constraints of the
fourteenth amendment and susceptible to suit under section

46. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 103 Nev. 331, 337, 741 P.2d 1345, 1349 (1987).
47. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 462.
48. Id. at 461.
49. Id. at 462.
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1983.50
With respect to the NCAA, the Court began by considering
whether the NCAA acted under color of state law when it
promulgated the rules in question. Unlike the court in Howard,
the Supreme Court focused solely upon the participation of the
NCAA representatives from the State of Nevada rather than on
the collective participation of all public institutions within the
NCAA. From this perspective, the Court concluded that the
NCAA's legislation came not from Nevada but from an "organization that is independent of any particular State.""1 Furthermore, the Court assumed that UNLV was free to disassociate itself from the NCAA and create its own rules. Based upon that
assumption, the Court ruled that the NCAA was not acting under
color of state law when it promulgated its rules even though Nevada had participated in their enactment and implemented their
standards.52
Next, the Court considered whether the NCAA acted under
color of state law when it investigated UNLV and issued its determinations concerning Tarkanian. Tarkanian argued that such authority resulted from a delegation of power from UNLV to the
NCAA, and therefore, must be classified as state action.53 The
Court recognized that "a state may delegate authority to a private
party and thereby make that party a state actor."" The Court,
however, insisted that the NCAA was without any authority to
sanction any UNLV employee, including Tarkanian. Although the
Association could impose severe sanctions upon the university for
failing to implement its recommendations, the NCAA could not
utilize any governmental form of enforcement to carry them out.55
Furthermore, since the NCAA and UNLV acted more like adversaries than partners throughout this' process, the Court felt that
any arguments alleging joint action were clearly without merit.56
As a last resort, Tarkanian argued that "the power of the
NCAA is so great that UNLV has no practical alternative to
compliance with its demands. 57 In response to that argument, the

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Id. at 463.
Id.
Id. at 464.
Id. at 464-65.
Id. at 464.
Id. at 465.
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Court held that "even if we assume that a private monopolist can
impose its will on a state agency by a threatened refusal to deal
with it, it does not follow that such a private party is therefore
' Having countered all of
acting under color of state law." 58
Tarkanian's allegations, the Supreme Court concluded that the
NCAA was not a state actor and had not acted under color of
Nevada law. Thus, the decision rendered by the Nevada Supreme
Court was reversed.5
B.

Dissenting Opinion

In reaching the opposite conclusion, the dissent relied upon a
more straightforward test. Citing precedent, the dissenters stated
that "private parties could be found to be state actors, if they
were 'jointly engaged with state officials in the challenged action.' "0 The dissent applied this test by focusing on the relationship between the NCAA and the UNLV. First, the dissent
pointed out that Tarkanian was suspended for violating NCAA
rules and that those rules had been contractually embraced by
UNLV. Second, under the terms of their membership agreement,
the NCAA was to conduct all hearings and serve as the fact
finder for all matters involving rule violations. Third, UNLV was
bound by any such factual determinations. Furthermore, those
findings were not subject to review by any other entity.61
The dissent also noted the irrelevancy of the fact that UNLV
had the option to sever its ties with the NCAA. The dissent argued that, as in a conspiracy, liability attaches when the parties
act in concert with respect to the wrongful act.62 Based upon this
approach, the dissent concluded that the NCAA was a state actor
and therefore subject to suit under section 1983.63

III.

ANALYSIS

The distinction between the opinion of the majority and that
of the dissent lies not so much in the rules that they apply as it
does in the manner in which they apply them. The majority chose
a technical and conservative approach. The dissent, on the other
58. Id.
59. Id. at 466.
60.

Id. at 466 (quoting Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27-28 (1985)).

61. Id. at 466-67.
62. Id. at 467-68.
63.

Id. at 468 (footnote omitted).
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hand, took a more pragmatic approach in an effort to achieve a
result that was both logical and just. Although both views have
obvious merits, the result of the case seems to indicate that the
dissent adopted the preferable alternative.
The critical factor in the majority's opinion was the fact that
the university, not the NCAA, was the entity that actually suspended Tarkanian. The majority also relied heavily upon the fact
that UNLV was free to ignore the NCAA and to disassociate itself from the organizations. However, that conclusion arguably ignores the importance of NCAA membership. NCAA membership
carries with it a tremendous amount of prestige. The resulting notoriety allows member institutions to benefit financially. Often,
NCAA games and tournaments are nationally televised. The proceeds from the television contracts "flow directly to the participat' In the 1970s,
ing schools, primarily the public universities." 64
member institutions received approximately thirteen million dollars annually through their affiliation with the NCAA.65 The publicity provided to member institutions by the NCAA also adds a
tremendous boost to enrollment. Therefore, public universities
cannot simply disassociate themselves from the NCAA because
such a parting would be financially damaging to any institution.
With the constant threat of expulsion, universities are somewhat
forced to heed the recommendations imposed by the NCAA.
As the dissent points out, the NCAA's recommendations are
based upon factual determinations which may not be appealed to
another entity for review. 66 Thus, the majority's decision grants
the NCAA unfettered discretion with respect to such *decisions.
With this authority, the Committee on Infractions can force a
university to suspend employees by threatening the univesity with
expulsion from the Association. Such authority is clearly susceptible to abuse. Jealous committee and council members, which are
representatives of other competing universities, could use their positions to initiate and impose sanctions. For the reasons stated
above, the view adopted by the dissent is preferable. By determining that the NCAA and the university were joint actors, its decision seems more in touch with the practical realities underlying
this controversy.
The potential ramifications of the majority's decision must

64.
65.
66.

Howard Univ. v. NCAA, 510 F.2d 213, 220 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
Id.
Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 467.
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also be considered. As noted in Howard, the characterization of
the NCAA as a private actor for purposes of section 1983 creates
an avenue through which states can dodge section 1983 liability
by merely banding together to form a private organization "to
which they have relinquished some portion of their governmental
power."6 7 Under the majority's view, a private organization may
be entrusted with the authority to regulate a state agency, along
with its employees, provided that the organization does not enforce its regulations with state enforcerhient mechanisms.68 Such
an organization would be free to make determinations and recommendations concerning employee performance without fear of
penalty for any mistakes or intentional abuses of its authority.
This unfettered discretion would remain unchecked by section
1983 even if the private organization is a monopolist that could
indirectly inflict tremendous hardship on the state agency by simply refusing to deal with the agency if it failed to heed the organization's recommendations.69
Suppose a state were to surrender its authority to monitor the
performance of police officers to a private organization. Also, suppose that membership in that organization greatly enhanced the
ability of states to receive federal funds. Such an organization
could indirectly force states to suspend officers, yet remain undaunted by section 1983. Thus, although the majority was unquestionably correct when it stated that section 1983 liability should
only be imposed upon state actors, one could easily envision a situation in which a private actor could force a state agency to carry
out its will.70 In such situations, state compliance with the rules
and recommendations of a private organization would turn the
private organization's conduct into state action which should be
subjected to the protections provided in section 1983. Therefore,
the rigid view of the majority should be limited to the facts of this
case and only be applied to cases involving the characterization of
the NCAA. Since the majority acknowledged that the Tarkanian
controversy was not a typical section 1983 state action case, 7 ' lim-

67.
NCAA,
text.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Howard Univ. v. NCAA, 510 F.2d 213, 220 (D.C. Cir. 1975)(quoting Parish v.
506 F.2d 1028, 1033 (5th Cir. 1975)). See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying
Tarkanian, 109 S.Ct. at 464-65.
Id. at 465.
Id. at 461.
See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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iting the application of the Court's decision does not appear
unwarranted.
RICHARD

A. Di Lisi

